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Autonomy and performance in the public sector: 
The experience of English NHS hospitals 
 
 
April 2017 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Since 2004, English NHS hospitals have been given the opportunity to acquire a more 
autonomous status known as a Foundation Trust (FT), whereby regulations and restrictions 
over financial, management and organisational matters were reduced in order to create 
incentives to deliver higher quality services in the most efficient way. Using difference-in-
difference models, we test whether achieving greater autonomy (FT status) improved 
hospital performance, as proxied by measures of financial management, quality of care and 
staff satisfaction. Results provide little evidence that the FT policy per se has made any 
difference to the performance of hospitals in most of these domains. Our findings have 
implications for health policy and inform the trend towards granting greater autonomy to 
public sector organisations.  
 
Keywords. Foundation Trusts; hospital reform; autonomy; hospital performance; treatment 
effects; policy evaluation.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Reform in the English NHS has for some time been aimed at giving healthcare providers 
greater independence and freedom from central government control in a number of ways. 
One element of the reform was the introduction of Foundation Trust (FT) status. This gives 
NHS hospitals the opportunity to become independent not-for-profit public benefit 
corporations which, whilst remaining in the public sector, are granted greater autonomy over 
financial, management and organizational matters. Similar changes have also been introduced 
in other countries, where quasi-autonomous or autonomous hospital organizations have been 
created over the last two decades. For example, in Nordic countries a substantial number of 
publicly financed hospitals have been reorganised into quasi-independently managed public 
firms. The trend of decentralizing decision structures appears particularly evident in 
Norwegian hospitals, where responsibilities for personnel and capital have been delegated to 
the department level of the hospital enterprise [1]. In Italy, major public hospitals (so-called 
Aziende Ospedaliere) have been given greater financial and decision-making autonomy, and 
granted the status of semi-independent hospital firms [2]. Similarly, various forms of 
autonomous hospitals have been created in Spain and Portugal [3]. 
 
Saltman et al [4] suggest three possible inter-connected factors driving this organizational 
shift towards greater autonomy: first, rapid technological improvement in clinical and 
information capacity among hospitals; second, growing patient expectations around quality, 
safety, responsiveness and choice of healthcare providers; and consequently, third, growing 
political pressures on public authorities to restructure the command and control relationships 
embedded within traditional governance models of publicly owned institutions.  
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In the English NHS, applying for FT status has been voluntary to date, but access is 
dependent on the performance of hospital Trusts (hereafter referred to as hospitals): only 
those meeting the criteria of the regulator are allowed to apply for FT status. The assessment 
process for approval to become an FT involves a number of detailed criteria which are 
documented at length by Monitor, the independent regulator of FTs [5-6].1 However, in brief, 
three main questions are asked: Is the hospital well governed? Is the hospital financially 
viable? Is the hospital legally constituted? There are numerous specific requirements in each 
of these three areas and Monitor uses a risk rating procedure to assess whether the hospital 
meets the criteria. The first phase of policy implementation occurred in 2004/5 when 25 acute 
hospitals became FTs. The number of FTs increased after 2004/5, rising to 83 acute hospitals 
in 2008/9 (Table 1) and 101 acute hospitals in 2015/6 (about 65% of total acute hospitals). 
The policy focus on extending FT status to all NHS hospitals is based to a substantial extent 
on the belief that FTs will deliver “high productivity, greater innovation, better care and 
greater job satisfaction” [7].   
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Despite the increasing trends towards devolved hospital governance in several European 
countries, little is yet known about the effects on hospital performance. In this paper, we 
address that research gap by examining the effects of introducing greater autonomy (FT 
status) to English NHS hospitals on their performance, as proxied by measures of financial 
performance, quality of care and staff satisfaction. Achieving FT status may create incentives 
for performance improvement via a number of mechanisms. FTs are allowed to have easier 
access to public and private sources of capital, to retain financial surpluses as well as to 

1
 From April 2016, Monitor has changed its name to NHS Improvement.  
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decide not to run a financial surplus every year [8]. One may expect the greater financial 
freedoms granted to FTs to give them financial advantages by taking a longer planning 
horizon in borrowing and investment decisions. Moreover, FTs have the freedom to develop 
local recruitment and retention initiatives, they can alter terms by agreement or by reissuing 
new contracts, and they can choose their own pay rates. In principle, this may serve to attract 
a more able workforce from other providers, with potential benefits in terms of staff job 
satisfaction and quality of care. Whilst acknowledging there may also be a risk of some 
initiatives such as pay rises to producing unintended effects by attracting staff who are less 
likely to have a vocation [9], overall the freedom to set terms and conditions was intended to 
be positive. Such effects on quality may be dampened or amplified by the lower profit 
constraints of FTs. On the one hand, reducing profit constraints may increase hospital 
incentives to compete on quality since additional revenues from higher demand can be 
appropriated more easily. On the other hand, however, it may induce hospitals to provide 
lower quality by strengthening their profit motive [10], which may have the effect of 
“crowding out” the intrinsic motivation of public service workers.  
 
FTs differ from non-FTs also with respect to their governance structure. With the opportunity 
for local people, staff and patients to participate in the decision-making process of their 
hospitals, FTs are expected to increase the relative weight given to community views and to 
enhance staff morale. Moreover, a lower degree of regulation and monitoring may increase 
the workers’ “intrinsic” motivation to perform their work activity with potential positive 
effects on hospital performance [11]. Evaluating the impact of FT status on staff morale is an 
important issue with implications for the level of effort exerted to deliver quality services. 
Some studies show that if public service motivation exists, employees are more likely to 
increase their effort to deliver a valued social service [12]. Thus, if FTs are more altruistic 
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and motivated than non-FTs, the willingness of workers to exert higher effort (and produce 
better services) may be positively affected by the more autonomous governance 
arrangements. 
 
Although FTs have historically been successful in generating and accumulating financial 
surpluses, the extent to which surpluses are a function of FT status is debatable [13]. Previous 
comparisons of the financial performance of FTs and non-FTs suggested that there had not 
been any significant change following the introduction of FT status [14]. However, the 
analysis covered only one year of post policy implementation, with only 10 hospitals being 
FTs for the entire financial year 2004/5. Thus, these results may have reflected the relatively 
early stage of the FT process. A later study found that one of the greatest advantages 
perceived by FTs was the ability to build their surpluses and to re-invest in order to expand 
and develop services [15]. But the analysis focused on only four FTs and it was not possible 
to conclude that the more autonomous governance structure was the specific mechanism 
responsible for the enhanced financial performance of hospitals.  
 
So far, only a small number of studies have explored the impact of FT status on working 
environment and staffing policies, with early reviews showing no positive impact on staff 
morale, and levels of staff engagement in FT management found to be low [16-17]; and 
research failing to find a link between the extended freedoms and motivation of senior 
hospital managers [18]. There is some anecdotal evidence showing better staff satisfaction 
due to conditions such as enhanced roles, the introduction of organisational bonus schemes 
[19], more freedoms for nursing staff, and the potential to grant national pay awards earlier 
than non-FTs [20]. However, it is not possible through simple comparisons to attribute the 
above differences to FT status per se. 
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This is, to our knowledge, the first comprehensive and robust evaluation of the effect of FT 
status on hospital performance. Our empirical analysis improves on previous work [14] in 
that we explicitly deal with the fact that hospitals became FTs at different times during the 
study period, and we take into account possible differences between the effect of recently 
becoming an FT (i.e. in the first year when a hospital actually became an FT) from the effect 
in later years. Moreover, this paper contributes to the existing literature in three ways: a) by 
offering additional evidence on the impact of FT status on financial performance [14] with 
the inclusion of a larger number of hospitals that became FTs over a longer period of time 
(between 2004/5 and 2008/9), which might have given greater scope for FTs to exploit their 
freedoms; b) by examining differences between FTs and non-FTs on aspects of quality, 
including Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus (MRSA) infection rates, waiting 
times and reported instances by staff witnessing potentially harmful errors; and c) by using 
staff satisfaction measures to test whether the opportunity to engage in hospital management 
has had any impact on staff morale.  
 
Overall, our results provide little evidence that the FT policy per se has made any impact on 
hospital performance.We mostly find no significant differences between the effect in the first 
year in which hospitals became FTs and in subsequent years, suggesting that the greater 
autonomy granted to FTs did not translate either into transitory or permanent improvements 
in hospital performance. Decentralisation and a move towards more devolved systems with 
greater autonomy is echoed across public sector organisations more generally, for instance in 
relation to academy schools in England (e.g. [21-23]). Hence, the results of this study, 
although specific to the experience of FTs in England, may be of some interest also for a 
wider literature concerned with the effects of granting greater independence and freedom 
from central government control to publicly funded providers.  
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2. Methods 
 
Using panel data over the period 2001/2 to 2008/9, we employ a difference-in-difference 
(DID) methodology to test whether there are any differences in hospital performance between 
FTs and non-FTs as a response to the FT policy. Our baseline econometric specification can 
be represented formally as follows:    
 検沈痛 噺 紅待 髪 紅怠隙沈痛 髪 紘沈 髪 紘痛 髪 絞怠畦血建結堅沈痛 抜 繋劇沈 髪 綱沈痛                                                    (1) 
 
where 検沈痛 is the key policy indicator for hospital i in period t, and t covers the period 2001/2 
to 2008/9 for our measures of financial performance and quality of care, and the period 
2003/4 to 2008/9 for our measures of staff satisfaction; 隙沈痛 is a vector of controls which 
measure observable time-varying characteristics of hospitals; 紘沈 and 紘痛 are the hospital and 
year fixed-effects, respectively; 繋劇沈 is a dummy variable for FT status, being equal to 1 if the 
hospital earned the status of FT during the period of study, and 0 otherwise(this means that 
if, for example, a hospital became an FT in the year 2008/9, then the treatment variable for 
this hospital will take value 1 for every year over the period 2004/5 to 2008/9); 畦血建結堅沈痛 is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if a hospital has become an FT by time t, and 0 otherwise; and 綱沈痛 
is the white noise error term.  
 
Using Eq. (1), we control for fixed differences between hospitals that became FTs and those 
that never acquired the FT status through the hospital fixed-effects, which account for any 
time-invariant hospital-specific factors that may influence hospital performance. The year 
fixed-effects absorb the effects of unobserved factors that are common to all hospitals in a 
given year. The impact of the FT policy is estimated by 絞怠, which captures performance 
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changes related to hospitals after they actually became FTs. Our control group is represented 
by all hospitals at time t that have not (at least yet) become FTs.2  
 
The implicit restriction made in Eq. (1) is that the impact of the FT policy is assumed to be 
the same in all years once hospitals became FTs. To relax this assumption, we allow the 
effect in the first year when a hospital actually became an FT to be separated from the effect 
in later years, by estimating the following regression model:        
 検沈痛 噺 紅待 髪 紅怠隙沈痛 髪 紘沈 髪 紘痛 髪 絞怠畦血建結堅沈痛嫗 抜 繋劇沈 髪 絞態畦血建結堅沈痛嫗嫗 抜 繋劇沈 髪 綱沈痛                         (2) 
 
where 畦血建結堅沈痛嫗  is a dummy variable taking value 1 in the year in which a hospital became an 
FT, and 0 otherwise; and 畦血建結堅沈痛嫗嫗 is a dummy variable taking value 1 in the period 
subsequent to the year in which a hospital became an FT, and 0 otherwise. Hence, the 
estimated coefficient 絞怠 in Eq. (2) gives the effect of just being an FT, whereas 絞態 captures 
the effect of being an FT in subsequent years. 
 
In order to correctly identify the impact of the FT policy using the specifications given by Eq. 
(1) and (2), the DID approach crucially relies on the assumption that assignment of hospitals 
to the treatment and control groups is random. However, in the context of the reform under 
study, this assumption is violated as hospitals can volunteer for FT status (subject to 
performance requirements). Therefore, we are concerned with addressing the potential bias 
arising from self-selection, and the related issue of possible unobserved factors which may 

2
 An example of this approach is the paper by Propper et al [24], which investigates the impact of the general 
practitioner (GP) fundholder scheme on hospital waiting times in the UK NHS. The fundholder policy is similar 
to the FT policy in several ways (e.g. it was voluntary and practices joined the scheme at different times), hence 
the methodological approach takes these factors into account.  
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have driven the decision of hospitals to become FTs, and which are correlated with hospital 
performance.  
 
We partly account for potential self-selection of FT status by including hospital fixed effects 
in the regression models given by Eq. (1) and (2). Hospital fixed-effects allow us to control 
for fixed (i.e. temporally invariant) differences in hospital performance: if hospitals that 
opted to become FTs have had a higher performance than other hospitals through the entire 
period of study, then the effect will be captured by the hospital fixed-effects. However, the 
hospital fixed-effects do not capture unobserved factors that may vary both across hospitals 
and over time, and may, in turn, be correlated with hospital performance. In particular, we 
identify the impact of the FT policy under the assumption that time trends in hospital 
performance caused by unobserved factors are the same between hospitals that became FTs 
and those that did not. This condition will not hold if, for example, hospitals that were 
already experiencing increases in their performance before acquiring the status of FT were 
also more likely to become FTs in subsequent years. If this is the case, then the estimated 
effects provided by Eq. (1) and (2) will simply reflect a continuation of pre-existing trends.  
 
In section 4, we formally account for possible pre-existing trends by adding to the 
specifications given in Eq. (1) and (2) the interaction between 繋劇沈 and the dummy variable 鶏堅結沈痛, which equals 1 in all years prior to the year in which a hospital actually became an FT, 
and 0 otherwise (the omitted category is the first year of observation). In this way, we isolate 
the impact of the FT policy from the potential effect of pre-existing trends. For our staff 
satisfaction measures, data are only available from year 2003/4 onwards, and thus we run this 
specification with the inclusion of the pre-trend control variable after excluding the first wave 
of FTs, which comprises hospitals that became FTs in year 2004/5. 
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3. Data 
 
Conditional on availability of longitudinal hospital data, we focus on measures of financial 
performance, quality of care, and staff satisfaction as described in detail in section 3.1 below. 
All the selected dimensions of performance were those that policy makers have focused on 
when explaining the rationale for the FT policy. Thus, the choice of our indicators, while 
restricted by the need for a robust methodology that requires longitudinal hospital data, still 
allow us to test whether these expectations were met. The data used for our measures of 
financial performance and quality of care cover all acute hospitals in the English NHS for the 
8 year-period from 2001/2 to 2008/9, whereas data availability is restricted to years 2003/4-
2008/9 for our measures of staff satisfaction.3 Table A1 in the web appendix provides the 
variable definitions and some descriptive statistics for the hospital performance measures and 
the explanatory variables used in the regression analysis.  
 
 
3.1  Dependent variables  
 
We examine the financial management aspect of the FT policy by using two indicators. The 
first one is the retained surplus (deficit), measured as a proportion of total expenditure. As in 
previous studies (e.g. [25]), we use surplus of the hospital as a key measure of performance 
for the government. Indeed, policymakers and regulators view surplus as an indicator of the 
financial "health" of organisations and a key performance measure against which all hospitals 
are assessed. Whilst in some contexts, spending surpluses in priority areas (e.g. on temporary 
staff to cover shortages) may be a positive rather than a negative event, there is a very strong 
policy signal that surpluses are associated with good financial conditions, and regulatory 
intervention is triggered when surpluses shift [26]. In this study, both retained surplus 

3
 Both for-profit and not-for-profit independent providers are excluded from our analysis, which refers to public 
hospital Trusts only. 
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(deficit) and total expenditure were obtained from the Trust Financial Returns (TFRs) 
provided by the Department of Health (DH) for non-FTs. These data also cover FTs for the 
fraction of the year in which FTs were non-FTs. For the remaining months of the financial 
year and for all years in which FTs were fully operational, data for FTs were drawn from the 
annual Income and Expenditure Accounts provided by the Finance Department of each FT. 
The lack of a central data return, such as TFRs, to the DH, is one of the freedoms enjoyed by 
FTs, which makes policy evaluation more challenging. Our second measure of financial 
performance is the Reference Cost Index (RCI), defined as an activity weighted average of a 
hospital’s Healthcare Resource Group (HRG) unit costs relative to the national average.4 
Data on RCI for all FTs and non-FTs were compiled from the DH. The RCI can be used as a 
measure of relative hospital efficiency, as it compares the actual average cost of an 
organisation’s aggregate activity with that same activity delivered at the national average 
cost, allowing for differences in terms of patients’ case-mix and local input prices - low cost 
(more efficient) hospitals will have an RCI below 100, while high cost (less efficient) 
hospitals will have an RCI above 100 [27].  

The quality of care measures we use are MRSA infection rates, waiting times, and the 
witnessing of “near misses” and errors by NHS staff. Low MRSA prevalence is often used as 
a marker for general quality [28]. In England, concerns about increasing trends in the MRSA 
infection rates led to the introduction ofa national target, announced in November 2004, to 
halve the number of MRSA infections by March 2008. In our analysis, MRSA infection rates 
are measured as the reported number of patients diagnosed with MRSA bacteraemia per 

4
 Like Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs), HRGs contain clinically similar treatments with similar costs. All 
inpatient elective and non-elective schedules used for the reference cost dataset are based on data truncation, 
excluding bed days that fall outside of nationally set length of stay trimpoints. The costs of any days beyond 
these trimpoints are excluded to provide a like-for-like comparison of activity and costs. The RCI was also 
adjusted by the market forces factor (MFF) in order to take account of some areas of the country with higher 
costs for staff, land or buildings.  
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10,000 bed-days within the hospital. Targeting waiting times for elective care has been a 
salient feature of the English NHS over many years, and previous studies suggest that the 
imposition of targets led to a fall in waiting times for elective care [29-30]. In line with 
previous empirical studies (e.g. [25]), we interpret longer waiting times as a negative form of 
quality, with the better performing hospitals being those ensuring shorter waiting times on 
average. Waiting times are measured as the average number of days between the decision to 
be admitted on the waiting list and the actual admission for elective treatment. Our final 
indicator of quality of care is derived from the NHS National Staff Survey undertaken by the 
Care Quality Commission and is defined as the proportion of staff who, in the previous 
month, had witnessed at least one error or near miss that could have potentially hurt patients 
or staff.  
 
As measures of working environment and staff morale, we use two further indicators derived 
from the NHS National Staff Survey, namely job satisfaction and intention to leave. Both 
these variables can also be seen as instruments of hospital quality in terms of what they 
suggest about the work environment and culture, but are not direct measures of quality of 
care.5 Staff job satisfaction is a composite measure derived from the following items: 
satisfaction in terms of recognition for good work; support from immediate managers and 
colleagues; freedom to choose methods of working; amount of responsibility; opportunities 
to use skills; and the extent to which the hospital is seen to value the work of staff.A score 
ranging from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 5 (“strongly agree”) was given to each answer, and 

5
 Earlier studies have shown that intentions of staff to quit is negatively related to job satisfaction (e.g. [31]). In 
line with this finding, in our sample we find a negative correlation between job satisfaction and intention to 
leave. The correlation between the two variables is equal to – 0.66. Higher levels of job dissatisfaction raise 
concerns on the level of effort exerted by staff professionals and hence on the provided quality of care. 
Moreover, high staff turnover may lead to over-reliance on temporary and agency staff in hospitals and, as such, 
is one of the “organizational health” indicators used by the regulator as a signal of possible governance 
concerns. Consistent with this interpretation, and following previous work that has linked higher staff intentions 
to leave to poorer quality of management (e.g. [32]), in our study we consider lower intentions of staff to quit as 
an indicator of better hospital performance. 
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the average score of each response was derived. The final measure was then calculated by 
summarizing the average score for each respondent and using a weighting procedure such 
that responses from each hospital contributed an amount to the total that was directly 
proportional to the number of staff employed by that hospital. Finally, intention to leave is a 
measure of the extent to which staff are considering leaving their organization and looking 
for a new job either within or outside of the NHS.This variable asks staff to indicate on a 
scale from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 5 (“strongly agree”) to what extent they agree with the 
following questions: “I often think about leaving this Trust”; “I will probably look for a new 
job at a new organization in the next 12 months”; “as soon as I can find another job, I will 
leave this Trust”. The final index was then calculated following the same weighting 
procedure used to derive staff satisfaction.  
 
 
3.2  Explanatory variables 
 
We use a number of explanatory variables at provider level to make our analysis more robust 
by allowing for the influence of a wide range of time-varying observed confounders. The 
data were collected from several sources including Hospital Episode Statistics (HES), 
Hospital Activity Statistics (HAS), the Department of Health (DH) and the Care Quality 
Commission (CQC). The variables that we use in the regression analysis comprise measures 
on activity (totspells), efficiency in use of resources (daycase_spell and ipd_spell) and case-
mix (emerg_spell, propfem, age014p, age60p). We also use the retained surplus in the 
previous year (surplus_1) to test whether hospitals that end in surplus one year find it easier 
to achieve better performance (lower costs or higher quality care) in the following year, given 
that they may be able to buy extra activity [33].  
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3.3  Graphical analyses 
 
Appendix Figures A1-A2 display time trends in each of our dependent variables, separately 
by FT status. To plot these graphs, we grouped all hospitals that opted to become FTs during 
the sample period into one category, and compare them with all hospitals that never acquired 
FT status during the years of observation. As these graphs show, we find no evidence of any 
obvious breaks in hospital performance after the FT policy was implemented. FTs were 
always performing better than non-FTs, both before and after the introduction of the reform, 
suggesting that there were long-standing differences in hospital performance between the two 
groups of hospital organisations. While these graphs offer descriptive information about 
hospital performance by FT status, they do not control for important differences across 
hospitals and years included in our regression models, the results of which are discussed in 
the next section.   
 
  
4. Regression results 
 
Tables 2-8 present the results on the effect of being an FT in terms of each of our 
performance measures separately. Column 1 shows the impact of the FT policy on average 
over time (Eq. (1)), whereas column 3 separates the effect in the year in which a hospital 
became an FT from the effect in later years (Eq. (2)). Finally, columns 2 and 4, show our 
estimates after accounting for pre-existing trends. All regressions include year and hospital 
fixed-effects, with robust standard errors clustered at hospital level to account for 
heteroscedasticity and possible serial correlation in the error term.We used a version of the 
Hausman test extended to heteroscedasticity [34] in order to test the null hypothesis that 
covariates are uncorrelated with the individual-specific effects. Results rejected this 
hypothesis, thus supporting the FE over the RE specification. The only exceptions were 
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obtained for the intention of staff to leave variable, for which our estimates from using the FE 
and RE specifications are very similar (results available upon request).    
         
The results on surplus reported in Table 2 show that the coefficient on being an FT is positive 
but not significant, suggesting that on average the FT policy had no impact on this indicator. 
A higher effect is observed in the year in which hospitals became FTs than in later years, 
although the two estimated coefficients are not significantly different from each other. The 
significance of the post-policy coefficients increases after accounting for pre-existing trends. 
However, also the coefficients on the pre-trend control variable are positive and significant, 
indicating that hospitals that became FTs achieved a higher financial surplus already before 
they entered the FT programme. The post- and pre-policy coefficients are not significantly 
different from each other, providing no evidence that hospitals increased their financial 
surplus in response to the FT policy. Our second measure of financial performance in Table 3 
shows we never find a significant effect of the FT policy on the RCI. The coefficients on the 
pre-trend control variable are never significant, providing no evidence of differential trends 
before policy implementation.  
 
[Tables 2-3 about here] 
    
The estimates in Table 4 suggest that the FT policy had no impact on the MRSA rates either: 
the coefficients on the difference between FTs and non-FTs are insignificant both after 
hospitals became FTs and over the pre-reform period. Table 5 shows the results for waiting 
times. On average, relative to the pre-policy years, the difference in waiting times between 
hospitals that became FTs and those that never acquired the FT status is positive and 
significant. Specifically, this effect is significant at the 10% level in the first year in which 
16 
 
hospitals became FTs, and increased both in absolute levels and significance in later years. 
Once we control for pre-existing trends, the coefficient on the interaction with the first year 
of being an FT, 繋劇沈 抜 畦血建結堅沈痛嫗 , becomes insignificant at conventional levels, whereas the 
coefficient on the interaction with later years, 繋劇沈 抜 畦血建結堅沈痛嫗嫗, is still positive and significant 
at the 5% level. These results are consistent with the trends plotted in Figure A1 (d), showing 
that waiting times reduced in all hospitals over time, but this reduction was greater for non-
FTs than for FTs, especially in the last years of observation. As for our final measure of 
quality of care, the estimates in Table 6 provide no evidence that, after controlling for pre-
existing trends, being an FT affected the proportion of staff witnessing errors.      
 
[Tables 4-6 about here] 
 
Finally, Tables 7-8 show the results in terms of our measures of working environment and 
staff morale. While we find no evidence that being an FT affected staff job satisfaction, it 
appears that the staff intention to leave decreased in response to the FT policy. Once 
controlling for pre-existing trends, this effect is significant at the 10% level in the period 
following the first year in which hospitals became FTs. Moreover, there is no evidence of a 
significant effect before hospitals entered the FT programme. The estimated effect for the 
staff intention to leave is, however, small in magnitude: being an FT appears to have 
decreased staff intention to leave by only 0.05 points in the period subsequent to the year in 
which hospitals became an FT (as shown in Table A1, the sample mean and standard 
deviation of the intention of staff to leave variable are 2.7 and 0.14, respectively).   
 
[Tables 7-8 about here] 
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4.1 Robustness checks 
 
To further confirm the validity of our results, we also examine whether hospitals have 
responded in anticipation to the FT policy, by changing our pre-policy control variable so 
that it equals 1 in the year before hospitals became FTs. In addition, we also add a pre-trend 
control variable taking the value 1 in the period prior to the anticipation year, and 0 
otherwise. The results from these robustness checks are provided in the web appendix Tables 
A2-A8. As these tables show, our findings remain qualitatively unchanged, providing little 
evidence that the FT policy per se had any impact on hospital performance. Again, the only 
possible exception is for the staff intention to leave variable: as compared with non-FTs, the 
response of hospitals that opted to become FTs was to decrease the intention of staff to leave 
after the first year in which they actually became FTs. However, as before, the estimated 
coefficients indicate that this effect, albeit statistically significant, is small in magnitude. 
 
Finally, we also used Propensity Score Matching (PSM) as in Marini et al [14] to further 
address concerns that the group of non-FTs may not be a valid counterfactual for the 
treatment hospitals. The PSM method allows one to summarise pre-treatment characteristics 
of hospitals into a single propensity score, which describes the probability of receiving FT 
status conditional on pre-treatment characteristics. Based on this probability, we identified 
alternative matched control groups with “similar” propensity scores, by using Nearest-
Neighbour Matching, Kernel Matching and Stratification Matching as possible methods to 
match treated and control units [35]. We find that overall using alternative comparator groups 
provides results that are qualitatively very similar to those presented herein (results available 
on request). 
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5. Discussion and conclusions 
 
FTs are expected to achieve higher financial performance by enjoying greater control and 
flexibility over financial, management and organisational matters. Our results confirm earlier 
evidence provided by Marini et al [14] that the FT policy per se has made no significant 
change to the financial performance of FTs relative to non-FTs, as measured in terms of 
retained surplus and relative hospital efficiency (RCI). The positive and significant difference 
in financial surplus that we find between FT and non-FT groups before policy 
implementation can be interpreted as the result of long-standing differences between the two 
types of hospital organisations. Relative to the differential trends estimated over the pre-
reform period, we find no evidence that hospitals increased their financial surplus after 
becoming FTs.   
 
Further, we go beyond financial measures studied in earlier work by also testing whether the 
introduction of FT status has produced any impact in terms of quality of patient care and staff 
morale. Overall, our findings suggest that the introduction of the FT policy has had no 
significant impact on the quality of patient care as measured by lower MRSA rates, shorter 
waiting times, or lower proportions of NHS staff witnessing “potentially harmful errors, near 
misses or incidents”. With respect to waiting times in particular, we find that while both FT 
and non-FT groups experienced better performance over time, reductions in waiting times 
were larger in non-FTs than in FTs, especially in the last period of observation when non-FTs 
achieved greater improvements under higher waiting time pressure. Lastly, our measures of 
staff satisfaction show only small changes in hospitals with FT status. Whilst the FT policy  
may have positive or negative effects on worker morale [36], this does not appear to have 
happened. This may also be because, although FTs have the freedom to go outside of national 
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workforce contracts, there is limited evidence that they have done so [20 37], largely because 
of the risks of legal challenges on equal pay grounds [19].     
 
We acknowledge that the use of a panel data methodology restricted the possibility of 
exploring all the relevant dimensions of hospital performance due to the limited information 
available over the entire period of study. For example, aspects of quality including patients’ 
responsiveness and satisfaction beyond the domain of waiting times could not be explored in 
our analysis. However, the selected set of indicators are those that have received great 
attention by policymakers, and the use of a panel data approach has allowed us to test 
whether the effect of the FT policy was in line with these expectations. Moreover, there is 
evidence from the NHS that various elements of staff satisfaction (which we include as a 
measure) is linked positively to better patient outcomes (e.g. [38]). Thus, we may be 
capturing indirectly aspects of patient outcomes through the use of this measure as well.  
 
Despite not being able to identify a substantial positive “FT effect”, our analysis does not 
suggest that FTs are doing any worse than non-FTs in terms of our performance measures. So 
the issue perhaps is more one of whether the extra costs involved in setting up and regulating 
FTs are justified. The governance arrangements required for FTs have not been trivial and the 
running costs of the governance process estimated in the first phase of policy implementation 
were at ‘circa £200,000 per Trust’ leading to estimated annual costs of over £25 million [39]. 
On the other hand, we find little evidence that the FT policy has led to improvements in 
hospital performance, although it is possible that FT status brings other benefits which we 
could not test (such as service innovation).6  

6
 There are indeed examples of FTs introducing novel treatment paths and service arrangements [37 39], 
although it is difficult to know whether the hospitals would have been able to make such changes anyway 
without FT status.  
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Finally, rather than indicating that more autonomy has had no or little impact per se, it is 
possible that the way in which the FT policy has been implemented has limited the degree to 
which FTs have exercised real autonomy in practice, which in turn may have limited the 
gains made. Indeed, an “implementation gap” between policy and practice has been 
identified, indicating that, whilst FTs have been given the ability technically to exercise 
autonomy, they have in practice been unwilling to do so, pursuing autonomy to a limited 
extent, especially in relation to financial and personnel issues [40], although there are some 
very recent signals – for example in relation to the controversial junior doctors contract [41] 
– that FTs could decide to exercise those freedoms more often in future.  
 
Enhancing autonomy to publicly funded institutions has recently been a common trend in 
many regulated markets across the public sector. In addition to healthcare, similar plans to 
pilot greater autonomy for prisons in England are also being discussed. Another example is 
the education sector, since new types of publicly funded schools with greater autonomy than 
regular public schools have been developed in different countries such as the US, England 
and Sweden. A large amount of research has produced mixed evidence on the impact of such 
policies on educational standards (see, among others, [21-23], [42-49]) and there may be 
scope for further empirical testing on differences between short- and long-run effects. In our 
analysis in the healthcare context, overall we find no significant differences between the 
effect in the first year in which hospitals became FTs and in subsequent years, suggesting 
there were neither transitory nor permanent improvements in hospital outcomes that can be 
causally associated with the greater autonomy allowed by FT status. While recognising that 
these results are context specific, our research topic may be of some importance also beyond 
the UK context, and for all regulated markets across the public sector that are currently 
experiencing similar transitions, or plan to, in the future. Finally, it is interesting to note that 
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as pressures in the English NHS become more acute, there are recent signals that the extra 
financial autonomies granted to FTs are now being eroded as regulators seek to re-assert 
control and intervene in both FTs and non-FTs [26]. As with many policy initiatives 
however, there is a tendency for them eventually to come full circle, so there will no doubt be 
further future developments relating to autonomy in the health system.          
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Table 1 
Number of hospitals with FT status, 2004/5 to 2008/9 
2004/5 2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 2008/9 
Number of FTs in this year 25 32 54 68 83 
(% of total number of acute hospitals) (14) (19) (32) (40) (49) 
Number of acute hospitals becoming FTs in this year 25 7 22 14 15 
(% of total number of acute hospitals) (14) (4) (13) (8) (9) 
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Table 2 
Fixed effects regression results for difference-in-difference model:  
Average effect of Foundation status on retained surplus (deficit) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Years before becoming an FT 
- 
0.011*** 
- 
0.011*** 
(FT × Pre) (0.002) (0.002) 
  
[0.007;0.016]  [0.007; 0.016]
Once a FT  0.005 0.014*** 
- - (FT × After) (0.003) (0.003) 
 
[-0.001; 0.010] [0.007; 0.021]
  
Year became an FT  
- - 
0.006* 0.015*** 
(FT × After') (0.003) (0.004) 
 
  [-0.000; 0.011] [0.008; 0.023]
Year(s) after becoming an FT 
- - 
0.004 0.013*** 
(FT × After'') (0.004) (0.004) 
   [-0.004; 0.011] [0.005; 0.021]
R2 0.365 0.369 0.365 0.369 
N 1347 1347 1347 1347 
 
Notes: All models include year and hospital fixed-effects. Covariates used in the models: Totspells, 
Daycase_electives, Emerg_spell, Propfem, Age014p, Age60p. Robust standard errors clustered by hospital in 
parentheses; and confidence intervals in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 
1%. 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Fixed effects regression results for difference-in-difference model:  
Average effect of Foundation status on RCI 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Years before becoming an FT - 0.501 - 0.363 
(FT × Pre) (1.512) (1.501) 
  [-2.481; 3.483]  [-2.597; 3.324]
Once a FT  0.377 0.798 - - 
(FT × After) (0.904) (1.719) 
 [-1.405; 2.160] [-2.592; 4.188]   
Year became an FT  - - -0.772 -0.459 
(FT × After') (0.829) (1.597) 
   [-2.406; 0.862] [-3.609; 2.690]
Year(s) after becoming an FT - - 1.357 1.655 
(FT × After'') (1.183) (1.905) 
   [-0.975; 3.689] [-2.102; 5.412]
R2 0.691 0.691 0.693 0.693 
N 1331 1331 1331 1331 
 
Notes: All models include year and hospital fixed-effects. Covariates used in the models: Totspells, 
Daycase_electives, Emerg_spell, Propfem, Age014p, Age60p, Surplus_1. Robust standard errors clustered by 
hospital in parentheses; and confidence intervals in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** 
Significant at 1%. 
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Table 4 
Fixed effects regression results for difference-in-difference model:  
Average effect of Foundation status on MRSA rates 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Years before becoming an FT - 0.000 - 0.004 
(FT × Pre) (0.109) (0.108) 
  [-0.215; 0.215]  [-0.209;0.218] 
Once a FT  -0.047 -0.047 - - 
(FT × After) (0.074) (0.136) 
 [-0.194; 0.099] [-0.316; 0.221]   
Year became an FT  - - -0.015 -0.011 
(FT × After') (0.066) (0.126) 
   [-0.144; 0.115] [-0.260; 0.239]
Year(s) after becoming an FT - - -0.075 -0.071 
(FT × After'') (0.097) (0.150) 
   [-0.266; 0.117] [-0.368; 0.226]
R2 0.711 0.711 0.711 0.711 
N 1288 1288 1288 1288 
 
Notes: All models include year and hospital fixed-effects. Covariates used in the models: Daycase_electives, 
Emerg_spell, Propfem, Age014p, Age60p, Surplus_1. Robust standard errors clustered by hospital in 
parentheses; and confidence intervals in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 
1%.  
 
 
 
Table 5 
Fixed effects regression results for difference-in-difference model: 
Average effect of Foundation status on mean waiting time 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Years before becoming an FT - 0.284 - 0.777 
(FT × Pre) (2.519) (2.489) 
  [-3.683; 6.251]  [-4.132; 5.684] 
Once a FT  7.892** 8.973** - - 
(FT × After) (3.130) (4.467) 
 [1.721; 14.064] [0.164; 17.781]   
Year became an FT  - - 3.676* 4.346 
(FT × After') (2.058) (3.558) 
   [-0.381; 7.734] [-2.671; 11.364]
Year(s) after becoming an FT - - 11.49** 12.13** 
(FT × After'') (4.576) (5.544) 
   [2.463; 20.512] [1.193; 23.059] 
R2 0.769 0.769 0.771 0.771 
N 1326 1326 1326 1326 
 
Notes: All models include year and hospital fixed-effects. Covariates used in the models: Totspells, 
Daycase_electives, Emerg_spell, Propfem, Age014p, Age60p, Surplus_1. Robust standard errors clustered by 
hospital in parentheses; and confidence intervals in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** 
Significant at 1%. 
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Table 6 
Fixed effects regression results for difference-in-difference model: 
Average effect of Foundation status on staff witnessing potentially harmful errors, near  
misses or incidents 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Years before becoming an FT - 0.941 - 0.927 
(FT × Pre) (0.734) (0.745) 
  [-0.509; 2.391]  [-0.546; 2.400]
Once a FT  0.629 1.368 - - 
(FT × After) (0.482) (0.961) 
 [-0.323; 1.581] [-0.530; 3.267]   
Year became an FT  - - 0.321 1.267 
(FT × After') (0.496) (1.020) 
   [-0.658; 1.299] [-0.749; 3.282]
Year(s) after becoming an FT - - 0.987* 1.472 
(FT × After'') (0.575) (0.984) 
   [-0.149; 2.122] [-0.473; 3.417]
R2 0.857 0.855 0.857 0.855 
N 995 847 995 847 
 
Notes: All models include year and hospital fixed-effects. Covariates used in the models: Totspells, 
Daycase_electives, Emerg_spell, Propfem, Age014p, Age60p, Surplus_1. Columns (2) and (4) present the 
estimates without the first wave of FTs. Robust standard errors clustered by hospital in parentheses; and 
confidence intervals in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%. 
 
 
Table 7 
Fixed effects regression results for difference-in-difference model: 
Average effect of Foundation status on job satisfaction of staff 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Years before becoming an FT - 0.007 - 0.006 
(FT × Pre) (0.013) (0.013) 
  
[-0.018;0.032] 
 [-0.019; 0.031]
Once a FT  0.011 0.019 - - 
(FT × After) (0.008) (0.015) 
 [-0.006; 0.027] [-0.010; 0.049]   
Year became an FT  - - 0.012 0.015 
(FT × After') (0.008) (0.015) 
   [-0.005; 0.028] [-0.015; 0.046]
Year(s) after becoming an FT - - 0.010 0.023 
(FT × After'') (0.011) (0.016) 
   
[-0.011;0.030] [-0.009; 0.055]
R2 0.704 0.683 0.704 0.683 
N 995 847 995 847 
 
Notes: All models include year and hospital fixed-effects. Covariates used in the models: Totspells, 
Daycase_electives, Emerg_spell, Propfem, Age014p, Age60p, Surplus_1. Columns (2) and (4) present the 
estimates without the first wave of FTs. standard errors clustered by hospital in parentheses; and confidence 
intervals in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%. 
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Table 8 
Fixed effects regression results for difference-in-difference model:  
Average effect of Foundation status on staff intention to leave 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Years before becoming an FT - -0.002 - -0.001 
(FT × Pre) (0.019) (0.019) 
  [-0.039; 0.035]  [-0.039; 0.036]
Once a FT  -0.035*** -0.041* - - 
(FT × After) (0.012) (0.022) 
 [-0.058; -0.012] [-0.084; 0.001]   
Year became an FT  - - -0.028** -0.037 
(FT × After') (0.013) (0.023) 
   [-0.053; -0.003] [-0.083; 0.008]
Year(s) after becoming an FT - - -0.043*** -0.046* 
(FT × After'') (0.015) (0.024) 
   [-0.073; -0.014] [-0.092;0.001] 
R2 0.708 0.696 0.708 0.696 
N 995 847 995 847 
 
Notes: All models include year and hospital fixed-effects. Covariates used in the models: Totspells, 
Daycase_electives, Emerg_spell, Propfem, Age014p, Age60p, Surplus_1. Columns (2) and (4) present the 
estimates without the first wave of FTs. Robust standard errors clustered by hospital in parentheses; and 
confidence intervals in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%.   
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Figure A1 
Trends in performance for FTs and non-FTs in 2001/2-2008/9: 
(a) retained surplus (deficit), (b) RCI, (c) MRSA rates, and (d) mean waiting time (days) 
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Figure A2 
Trends in performance for FTs and non-FTs in 2003/4-2008/9: 
(a) witnessing potentially harmful errors (b) job satisfaction of staff and (c) intention of staff to leave 
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Table A1 
Descriptive statistics and variable definitions, years 2001/2-2008/9 
 
Variable Definition Source N Mean  Std dev Min Max 
Surplus Retained surplus (deficit) as proportion of total expenditure (£s) DH and Annual Accounts 1379 -0.002 0.029 -0.217 0.112 
Rci_excess Reference Cost Index excluding  DH 1391 100.364 10.783 68.794 165.817 
excess bed days adjusted by the Market Forces Factor (MFF) 
     
Mrsa_rate MRSA patients per 10,000 bed-days CQC 1337 1.538 2.852 0 94.458 
Meanwait Mean waiting time (days) HES 1374 79.999 32.315 0 339 
Witnessing_errors Percentage of staff witnessing  CQC 1028 42.790 7.326 22 71 
 potentially harmful errors, near misses or incidents 
     
Job_satisfaction Job satisfaction of staff CQC 1028 3.428 0.087 3.11 3.73 
Staff_turnover Intention of staff to leave in next 12 months CQC 1028 2.667 0.140 2.15 3.17 
FT Dummy = 1 if hospital = FT, 0 otherwise DH 1397 0.472 0.499 0 1 
2001/2 Dummy = 1 if year = 2001/2, 0 otherwise Authors’ calculation 1397 0.138 0.345 0 1 
2002/3 Dummy = 1 if year = 2002/3, 0 otherwise Authors’ calculation 1397 0.126 0.332 0 1 
2003/4 Dummy = 1 if year = 2003/4, 0 otherwise Authors’ calculation 1397 0.124 0.330 0 1 
2004/5 Dummy = 1 if year = 2004/5, 0 otherwise  Authors’ calculation 1397 0.124 0.330 0 1 
2005/6 Dummy = 1 if year = 2005/6, 0 otherwise Authors’ calculation 1397 0.124 0.330 0 1 
2006/7 Dummy = 1 if year = 2006/7, 0 otherwise Authors’ calculation 1397 0.122 0.328 0 1 
2007/8 Dummy = 1 if year = 2007/8, 0 otherwise Authors’ calculation 1397 0.121 0.326 0 1 
2008/9 Dummy = 1 if year = 2008/9, 0 otherwise Authors’ calculation 1397 0.121 0.326 0 1 
Totspells Total inpatient spells HES 1379 69034.73 39166.46 1040 232033 
Daycase_electives Day cases as proportion of elective admissions HES 1379 0.515 0.114 0 0.969 
Emerg_spell Emergency admissions per total inpatient spells  HES 1379 0.347 0.098 0.002 0.618 
Propfem Proportion of female patients HES 1379 0.526 0.071 0.125 0.882 
Age014p Proportion of patients under 15 years of age HES 1371 0.142 0.137 0 0.990 
Age1559p Proportion of patients between 15 and 59 years of age HES 1371 0.448 0.090 0.001 0.815 
Age60p Proportion of patients 60 years or older HES 1371 0.410 0.108 0 0.989 
 
DH: Department of Health. Annual Accounts: FT Annual Reports and Accounts. CQC: Care Quality Commission. HES: Hospital Episode Statistics. 
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Table A2 
Fixed effects regression results for difference-in-difference model:  
Average effect of Foundation status on retained surplus (deficit) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Before anticipation year - 0.010*** - 0.010*** 
(FT × Pre-anticipation) (0.003) (0.003) 
  
[0.005;0.015] 
 [0.005; 0.015]
Anticipation year 0.006*** 0.015*** 0.006*** 0.015*** 
(FT × Anticipation) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
 [0.001; 0.011] [0.009; 0.020] [0.001;0.011] [0.009; 0.020]
Once a FT  0.007** 0.015*** - - 
(FT × After) (0.003) (0.003) 
 [0.001; 0.013] [0.008; 0.021]   
Year became an FT  - - 0.008** 0.016*** 
(FT × After') (0.003) (0.004) 
   
[0.001;0.014] [0.008; 0.023]
Year(s) after becoming an FT - - 0.006 0.014*** 
(FT × After'') (0.004) (0.004) 
   [-0.001; 0.014] [0.006; 0.022]
R2 0.367 0.370 0.368 0.370 
N 1347 1347 1347 1347 
 
Notes: All models include year and hospital fixed-effects. Covariates used in the models: Totspells, 
Daycase_electives, Emerg_spell, Propfem, Age014p, Age60p. Robust standard errors clustered by hospital in 
parentheses; and confidence intervals in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 
1%. 
 
 
Table A3 
Fixed effects regression results for difference-in-difference model:  
Average effect of Foundation status on RCI 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Before anticipation year - 1.044 - 0.852 
(FT × Pre-anticipation) (1.556) (1.536) 
  [-2.025; 4.114]  [-2.176; 3.881]
Anticipation year -1.538* -0.677 -1.361 -0.663 
(FT × Anticipation) (0.926) (1.622) (0.914) (1.623) 
 [-3.363; 0.288] [-3.876; 2.521] [-3.163; 0.441] [-3.864; 2.538]
Once a FT  -0.197 0.612 - - 
(FT × After) (1.078) (1.737) 
 [-2.323; 1.930] [-2.814; 4.038]   
Year became an FT  - - -1.208 -0.523 
(FT × After') (1.019) (1.608) 
   [-3.217; 0.800] [-3.694; 2.647]
Year(s) after becoming an FT - - 0.787 1.423 
(FT × After'') (1.333) (1.928) 
   [-1.841; 3.415] [-2.380; 5.225]
R2 0.692 0.692 0.693 0.694 
N 1331 1331 1331 1331 
 
Notes: All models include year and hospital fixed-effects. Covariates used in the models: Totspells, 
Daycase_electives, Emerg_spell, Propfem, Age014p, Age60p, Surplus_1. Robust standard errors clustered by 
hospital in parentheses; and confidence intervals in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** 
Significant at 1%. 
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Table A4 
Fixed effects regression results for difference-in-difference model:  
Average effect of Foundation status on MRSA rates 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Before anticipation year - -0.008 - -0.001 
(FT × Pre-anticipation) (0.107) (0.105) 
  [-0.218; 0.203]  [-0.209; 0.206]
Anticipation year 0.022 0.016 0.017 0.016 
(FT ×Anticipation) (0.065) (0.125) (0.067) (0.125) 
 [-0.107; 0.152] [-0.231; 0.263] [-0.114; 0.148] [-0.231; 0.263]
Once a FT  -0.039 -0.045 - - 
(FT × After) (0.083) (0.138) 
 [-0.203; 0.126] [-0.317; 0.227]   
Year became an FT  - - -0.009 -0.010 
(FT × After') (0.074) (0.127) 
   [-0.154; 0.136] [-0.261; 0.240]
Year(s) after becoming an FT - - -0.068 -0.069 
(FT × After'') (0.108) (0.153) 
   [-0.280; 0.145] [-0.371; 0.233]
R2 0.711 0.711 0.711 0.711 
N 1288 1288 1288 1288 
 
Notes: All models include year and hospital fixed-effects. Covariates used in the models: Daycase_electives, 
Emerg_spell, Propfem, Age014p, Age60p, Surplus_1. Robust standard errors clustered by hospital in 
parentheses; and confidence intervals in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 
1%.  
 
Table A5 
Fixed effects regression results for difference-in-difference model: 
Average effect of Foundation status on mean waiting time 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Before anticipation year - 0.780 - -0.016 
(FT × Pre-anticipation) (2.386) (2.339) 
  [-3.926; 5.486]  [-4.628; 4.597] 
Anticipation year 1.731 2.374 2.447 2.434 
(FT × Anticipation) (2.264) (3.337) (2.275) (3.332) 
 [-2.734; 6.196] [-4.207; 8.956] [-2.040; 6.934] [-4.136; 9.005] 
Once a FT  8.541** 9.146** - - 
(FT × After) (3.621) (4.586) 
 [1.401; 15.680] [0.103; 18.189]   
Year became an FT  - - 4.463* 4.450 
(FT × After') (2.666) (3.627) 
   [-0.795; 9.721] [-2.703; 11.604]
Year(s) after becoming an FT - - 12.51** 12.50** 
(FT × After'') (5.080) (5.721) 
   [2.496; 22.533] [1.221; 23.785] 
R2 0.769 0.769 0.771 0.771 
N 1326 1326 1326 1326 
 
Notes: All models include year and hospital fixed-effects. Covariates used in the models: Totspells, 
Daycase_electives, Emerg_spell, Propfem, Age014p, Age60p, Surplus_1. Robust standard errors clustered by 
hospital in parentheses; and confidence intervals in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** 
Significant at 1%. 
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Table A6 
Fixed effects regression results for difference-in-difference model: 
Average effect of Foundation status on staff witnessing potentially harmful errors, near  
misses or incidents 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Before anticipation year - 0.695 - 0.667 
(FT × Pre-anticipation) (0.793) (0.813) 
  [-0.873; 2.263]  [-0.939; 2.273]
Anticipation year 0.767 1.241 0.785 1.237 
(FT × Anticipation) (0.602) (0.817) (0.603) (0.820) 
 [-0.423; 1.957] [-0.373; 2.856] [-0.407; 1.977] [-0.384; 2.858]
Once a FT  0.979 1.409 - - 
(FT × After) (0.681) (0.962) 
 [-0.367; 2.324] [-0.493; 3.310]   
Year became an FT  - - 0.846 1.281 
(FT × After') (0.687) (1.020) 
   [-0.511; 2.203] [-0.733; 3.296]
Year(s) after becoming an FT - - 1.161 1.542 
(FT × After'') (0.795) (0.989) 
   [-0.409; 2.731] [-0.411; 3.496]
R2 0.855 0.855 0.855 0.855 
N 847 847 847 847 
 
Notes: All models include year and hospital fixed-effects. Covariates used in the models: Totspells, 
Daycase_electives, Emerg_spell, Propfem, Age014p, Age60p, Surplus_1. Estimates are obtained without the first 
wave of FTs. Robust standard errors clustered by hospital in parentheses; and confidence intervals in brackets. * 
Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%. 
 
Table A7 
Fixed effects regression results for difference-in-difference model: 
Average effect of Foundation status on job satisfaction of staff 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Before anticipation year - 0.007 - 0.006 
(FT × Pre-anticipation) (0.014) (0.014) 
  [-0.020; 0.034]  [-0.021;0.033] 
Anticipation year 0.002 0.007 0.003 0.007 
(FT × Anticipation) (0.009) (0.013) (0.009) (0.013) 
 
[-0.015;0.020] [-0.019; 0.033] [-0.014; 0.021] [-0.019; 0.033]
Once a FT  0.015 0.019 - - 
(FT × After) (0.011) (0.015) 
 [-0.006; 0.037] [-0.010; 0.049]   
Year became an FT  - - 0.012 0.015 
(FT × After') (0.011) (0.015) 
   [-0.011; 0.034] [-0.015; 0.046]
Year(s) after becoming an FT - - 0.020 0.024 
(FT × After'') (0.013) (0.016) 
   [-0.005; 0.046] [-0.008; 0.056]
R2 0.683 0.683 0.683 0.683 
N 847 847 847 847 
 
Notes: All models include year and hospital fixed-effects. Covariates used in the models: Totspells, 
Daycase_electives, Emerg_spell, Propfem, Age014p, Age60p, Surplus_1. Estimates are obtained without the 
first wave of FTs. Robust standard errors clustered by hospital in parentheses; and confidence intervals in 
brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%. 
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Table A8 
Fixed effects regression results for difference-in-difference model:  
Average effect of Foundation status on staff intention to leave 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Before anticipation year - 0.002 - 0.003 
(FT × Pre-anticipation) (0.020) (0.020) 
  [-0.037; 0.041]  [-0.037; 0.042]
Anticipation year -0.008 -0.007 -0.008 -0.006 
(FT × Anticipation) (0.015) (0.021) (0.015) (0.021) 
 [-0.037; 0.021] [-0.048; 0.035] [-0.037; 0.021] [-0.048; 0.035]
Once a FT  -0.043*** -0.042* - - 
(FT × After) (0.016) (0.022) 
 [-0.075; -0.011] [-0.085; 0.001]   
Year became an FT  - - -0.039** -0.038 
(FT × After') (0.017) (0.023) 
   [-0.073; -0.006] [-0.083; 0.008]
Year(s) after becoming an FT - - -0.048** -0.047* 
(FT × After'') (0.020) (0.024) 
   [-0.088; -0.009] [-0.094; 0.000]
R2 0.696 0.696 0.696 0.696 
N 847 847 847 847 
 
Notes: All models include year and hospital fixed-effects. Covariates used in the models: Totspells, 
Daycase_electives, Emerg_spell, Propfem, Age014p, Age60p, Surplus_1. Estimates are obtained without the first 
wave of FTs. Robust standard errors clustered by hospital in parentheses; and confidence intervals in brackets. * 
Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%.   
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